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1. Wittgenstein’s Anti-Reductionism 
What is the relation between meaning and use?  Wittgenstein says that ‘the meaning of a word is its 
use in the language’ (PI §43).1  He makes a parallel claim about the sense of a proposition: ‘the use of 
a proposition – that is its sense’ (BT 80).  But what sort of illumination are we supposed to derive 
from those ideas? 
Consider a particular expression: the word ‘red’, for instance.  Part of Wittgenstein’s point is 
that the word ‘red’ means what it does because we use it in the way we do.  But the significance of 
that point depends on how we understand the notion of use.  We can distinguish between a 
reductionist and an anti-reductionist view.  The anti-reductionist thinks of the use of a word in a 
wholly quietist or pleonastic way.  On this view, all we can say about how use determines meaning is 
this: the word ‘red’ means red because we use it to mean red; the words ‘add 2 each time’ mean add 
two each time because they ‘are used by us to mean that two is to be added each time’ (Stroud 
2012, p. 27); and so on.  As Barry Stroud puts it, a description of the use of an expression that 
‘suffices to fix its meaning’ must itself ‘employ the idea of meaning’ (2012, p. 27).  That is the view 
that Stroud both endorses and attributes to Wittgenstein.2 
For the reductionist, by contrast, the point of the idea that meaning is use is to explain 
linguistic meaning in more basic terms.  She agrees that we use the word ‘red’ to mean red.  But she 
thinks we can spell out what is involved in using the word ‘red’ to mean red in a way that does not 
employ semantic concepts: in terms, for instance, of people’s dispositions to produce and respond 
to sounds or symbols containing ‘red’ in specified observable circumstances.  That is a view that 
many readers have ascribed to Wittgenstein.  According to Michael Dummett, for instance, when 
Wittgenstein describes the use of language,  
what is described is the complex of activities with which the utterances of sentences are 
interwoven; and . . . the description does not invoke psychological or semantic concepts, but 
is couched entirely in terms of what is open to outward view (Dummett 1978, p. 446). 
Paul Horwich agrees: Wittgenstein’s ‘examples of the meaning-constituting uses of words’, he 
writes, ‘are never couched in semantic or intentional terms’ (Horwich 2012, p. 112). 
 My own view is that Wittgenstein is an anti-reductionist about meaning and intentional 
content.  And I think Wittgenstein is right; facts about meaning and content cannot be constructed 
from or reduced to facts about use characterized in wholly non-semantic, non-intentional terms.  
But Wittgenstein does not adopt the most flat-footed, uncompromisingly anti-reductionist position 
on these matters.  For, though he insists that meaning cannot be explained or accounted for in other 
terms, he does think that there are interesting and non-pleonastic things to say about what it takes 
for an expression to be used with a particular meaning, including things about the relation between 
a word’s meaning what it does and facts about its use, characterized in non-semantic terms. That 
strand in his thinking emerges in many passages.  I will give two examples. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
Let us consider very simple rules.  Let the expression be a figure, say this one: 
|– –| 
and one follows the rule by drawing a straight sequence of such figures (perhaps as an 
ornament). 
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|– –||– –||– –||– –||– –| 
Under what circumstances should we say: someone gives a rule by writing down such a 
figure?  Under what circumstances: someone is following this rule when he draws that 
sequence?  It is difficult to describe this. 
If one of a pair of chimpanzees once scratched the figure |– –| in the earth and 
thereupon the other the series |– –||– –| etc., the first would not have given a rule nor 
would the other be following it, whatever else went on at the same time in the minds of the 
two of them. 
If however there were observed, e.g., the phenomenon of a kind of instruction, of 
showing how and of imitation, of lucky and misfiring attempts, of reward and punishment 
and the like; if at length the one who had been so trained put figures which he had never 
seen before one after another in sequence as in the first example, then we should probably 
say that the one chimpanzee was writing rules down, and the other following them (RFM VI 
§42). 
That passage illustrates a point that Wittgenstein makes a few remarks earlier: ‘What, in a 
complicated surrounding, we call “following a rule” we should certainly not call that if it stood in 
isolation’ (RFM VI §33).  What each chimpanzee does can be described in terms that do not 
presuppose that a rule is being given and followed; the first chimpanzee scratches the figure |– –| in 
the earth and the second scratches the series |– –||– –| etc.  If that is just a one-off occurrence, no 
rule has been given or followed.  When it happens in the right kind of context, we do have a case of 
giving and following a rule.  But what is the right kind of context?  What exactly are the 
circumstances under which we should say that a rule is being given and followed?  The most 
uncompromisingly anti-reductionist response to that question would be simply to say this: that the 
circumstances under which we should say that a rule is being given and followed are those in which 
people (or chimpanzees) are participating in a practice of giving and following rules or, more simply, 
in which a rule is indeed being given and followed.  But in the passage I have quoted, and others like 
it, Wittgenstein does not give that unhelpful answer.  Instead, he tries to say something genuinely 
informative and non-pleonastic about what it takes for there to be a custom of giving and following 
such rules, and what it takes for two people (or chimpanzees) to be participants in such a practice.3  
We can highlight two points. 
First, Wittgenstein thinks that the existence of a custom or practice of following rules 
requires there to be a whole pattern of rule-involving activity.  Some of the activities he mentions in 
RFM VI §42 are specific to the situation of learning: instruction, showing how, imitation, etc.  Others 
are more general: reward and punishment, for instance.  But the most basic feature of rule-
following, which is implicit in all the activities Wittgenstein mentions, is that giving or following rules 
involves acknowledging or understanding actions as being correct or incorrect.  The idea of 
acknowledging an action as correct or incorrect is no more basic than the idea of following a rule 
itself: to the extent that it is unclear whether two chimpanzees are really giving and following rules 
(as opposed to merely acting in a regular way), it will be equally unclear whether they are really 
acknowledging their actions as being correct or incorrect; and vice versa.4  As before, there is no 
prospect of a reductive account of rule-following.  Nonetheless, it is philosophically illuminating to 
set out the kind of structure of holistically related activities that provides the necessary background 
for something to count as an instance of rule-following. 
Second, it is a characteristic feature of Wittgenstein’s work to approach the task of saying 
something substantial about the circumstances in which an interaction counts as a case of a rule 
being given and followed by focusing on the procedure of someone’s learning to follow a rule.5  In 
describing the process of learning, we describe a process in which there is a transition from the 
learner’s doing things that do not yet involve following a rule (making marks, copying the teacher, 
etc.) to her engaging in rule-following activity.  In giving such a description we are not explaining 
what rule-following consists in in non-rule-involving terms.  Nonetheless, we are charting one kind of 
link between non-rule-involving facts and facts about following rules.  And that, Wittgenstein 
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suggests, is as close as we can get to giving an informative account in non-rule-involving terms of 
what rule-following consists in; ‘we can go no further’ (RFM VII §26). 
Now consider a second passage, in which Wittgenstein insists that the existence of a practice 
of multiplying requires the existence of lower-level regularities in linguistic behaviour. 
What if we said that mathematical propositions were prophecies in this sense: they predict 
what result members of a society who have learnt this technique will get in agreement with 
other members of the society? ‘25 x 25 = 625’ would thus mean that men, if we judge them 
to obey the rules of multiplication, will reach the result 625 when they multiply 25 x 25. -  
That this is a correct prediction is beyond doubt; and also that calculating is in essence 
founded on such predictions.  That is to say, we should not call something ‘calculating’ if we 
could not make such a prophecy with certainty.  This really means: calculating is a technique.  
And what we had said pertains to the essence of a technique. (RFM III §66.  For related 
comments, see e.g. RFM VI §23.) 
We could put the lesson of that passage like this.  Mathematical propositions are not prophecies, in 
any sense.  Nonetheless, take a group of people whom we judge to have learned to multiply and to 
obey the rules of multiplication.  Now say to them, ‘What is 25 x 25?’  We can predict that they will, 
by and large, respond by saying ‘625’.  That is an empirical prediction about their behaviour, non-
semantically characterized.  And it is a correct prediction; people who have been through a certain 
training and whom we judge to have mastered the rules of multiplication do generally respond in 
that way in these circumstances.  Wittgenstein’s point is that the existence of a practice of 
multiplication in a community depends upon the obtaining of patterns of non-semantic facts in 
virtue of which such prophecies, if someone chose to make them, would be true.6  If we could not 
make such prophecies ‘with certainty’, the people in question would not be calculating.  In this 
particular case, Wittgenstein is talking about the rules of multiplication and the technique of 
calculating.  But he would make the same points about rules and meaning in general.  
 
2. Supervenience 
It is natural to characterize the picture that emerges from passages like those discussed in Section 1 
in terms of supervenience.  Facts about meaning cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, 
non-semantic facts about use.  But facts about meaning do supervene on non-semantic facts about 
use.  That is to say, two worlds cannot differ in a semantic respect without differing in some non-
semantic respect.  Equivalently, if two worlds are alike in all non-semantic respects, they must be 
alike in all semantic respects.  In the rest of this essay I shall defend this supervenience thesis against 
some significant criticisms.  My primary goal is to defend the supervenience thesis itself.  But I shall 
also argue that the position I defend is consistent with Wittgenstein’s views. 
The thesis that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic facts about use can be 
understand in many different ways.  I shall follow Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor in spelling out 
the target thesis in the following way.7  First, the semantic facts that are claimed to supervene on 
non-semantic use facts are to be understood as inclusively as possible, as encompassing both facts 
about the meanings of words (‘The English word ‘plus’ refers to the plus function’; ‘Jane said that the 
rose was red’) and facts about the contents of thoughts and attitudes (‘Jane thought that Brexit was 
a terrible idea’, ‘Jim intended to buy his son a present’).  Second, the non-semantic facts about use 
that make up the supervenience base are also to be understood as widely as possible.  In particular, 
the facts about an expression’s use are to include the following.  (1) Facts about the community’s 
use of the expression, and not simply about any particular individual’s use.  (2) Facts about the 
physical environment in which the expression is used.  That accommodates semantic externalism’s 
insight that the meanings of many expressions are determined in part by which natural kinds and 
which individual things are present in speakers’ environments.8  (3) Facts, if there are such facts, 
about the relative naturalness of the properties and individuals to which expressions refer.  As 
Kearns and Magidor note, a common picture in contemporary philosophy is this.  Speakers’ linguistic 
dispositions, taken by themselves, are compatible with numerous different assignments of meaning.  
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Nonetheless, the English word ‘plus’ refers to the plus function rather than to any quus-like 
alternative, the word ‘green’ refers to the property of being green rather than to any grue-like 
alternative, and so on.  And what makes ‘plus’ mean what it does is in part that the plus function is 
objectively more natural than any such alternative, and hence more eligible to be picked out by our 
word.  Similarly for the word ‘green’ and the property of being green, and so on.9 
There is room for debate as to how far this conception of the non-semantic facts on which 
semantic facts supervene is consistent with Wittgenstein’s views.  I cannot resolve that question 
here.  But I will make two observations.  First (concerning point (2) above), some readers of 
Wittgenstein think that semantic externalism in the style of Kripke and Putnam is incompatible with 
Wittgenstein’s views, because it severs the essential connection between the meanings of people’s 
words and their own use of those words.10  I have argued elsewhere that that is a mistake; there is 
nothing in Wittgenstein that conflicts with the idea that we may use terms to refer to natural kinds 
in the way described by Kripke and Putnam.11  Second (concerning point (3)), the idea that objective 
naturalness plays any role in determining meaning will seem to many readers to be directly opposed 
to Wittgenstein’s views.  In my view, however, the issue is not clear cut.  I have argued elsewhere 
that Wittgenstein gives an important role in the determination of meaning to a notion of naturalness 
that is not constrained by the limits of our actual classificatory capacities, and thus that there is less 
distance between Wittgenstein’s position and the ‘natural-properties’ view than is generally 
assumed.12  But whether or not I am right about that, the important point for present purposes is a 
conditional one; if facts about the naturalness of properties and individuals do play a part in fixing 
the meanings of expressions, then the defender of semantic supervenience should count those facts 
as part of the non-semantic supervenience base. 
The thesis I want to defend, then, is this.  Semantic facts, taken to include facts about both 
linguistic meaning and intentional content, supervene on non-semantic facts, taken to include facts 
about the community’s use of words and concepts, facts about the physical environment, and facts 
(if such there be) about the naturalness of properties and individuals. 
 
3. Supervenience and Dispositional Properties 
In ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, John McDowell presents an anti-reductionist view of meaning 
and rule-following in terms of a distinction between two levels at which we can describe linguistic 
behaviour.  On the one hand there are descriptions at (or above) ‘bedrock’: descriptions in which 
language-use is characterized in semantic terms (‘She said that the post-box was red’, ‘He said that 
1000 plus 2 equals 1002’).  That, says McDowell, is the ‘deepest level at which we can sensibly 
contemplate the place of language in the world’ (McDowell 1984, p. 341).  On the other hand, there 
are ‘sub-bedrock’ descriptions, in which speakers’ behaviour is characterized without reference to 
meaning or rules (‘She made the sound “The post-box is red”’, ‘He put “1002” after “1000”’).  There 
is, McDowell says, ‘an intimate relation’ (1984, p. 349) between facts about rule-following and 
patterns of sub-bedrock facts such that ‘a certain disorderliness below “bedrock” would undermine 
the applicability of the notion of rule-following’ (1984, p. 349).  But ‘recognizing the intimate relation 
must not be allowed to obscure the difference of levels’ (1984, p. 349); no account of language in 
sub-bedrock terms can capture facts about meaning and rules.  That is the kernel of McDowell’s anti-
reductionism. 
 McDowell briefly considers the idea that ‘statements about rule-following supervene, in 
Wittgenstein’s view, on sub-“bedrock” statements’.  He comments: ‘There may be an acceptable 
interpretation of this; but on the most natural interpretation, it would make statements about rule-
following vulnerable to future loss of mutual intelligibility’ (1984, p. 362, n. 43), in a way that would 
falsify the epistemology of meaning and fail to accommodate common-sense truths.  So, he 
suggests, the ‘intimate relation’ between bedrock and sub-bedrock facts is not to be captured in 
terms of supervenience.  I agree with McDowell that the particular version of semantic 
supervenience he has in mind is unacceptable.  But working through his objections will point us to a 
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better version of the supervenience thesis, as well as preparing the ground for a response to further 
objections that we will meet below, in section 4. 
 McDowell associates the supervenience thesis with a particular picture of the epistemology 
of meaning.  In that picture, what we detect when someone speaks are in the first instance non-
semantic facts about the sounds he makes and the circumstances in which he makes them.  
Knowledge of what someone means by an expression depends on an inference from such non-
semantic facts about his use of the expression and involves hypotheses about his future use, non-
semantically characterized.  So, when I claim to understand someone, ‘I bind myself to a prediction 
of the uses of language he will make in various possible future circumstances, with these uses 
characterized in sub-“bedrock” terms’ (1984, p. 349).  The consequence of that picture, McDowell 
objects, is that any claim to know what someone else means by an expression is 
indefinitely vulnerable to the possibility of an unfavourable future.  Below ‘bedrock’ there is 
nothing but contingency; so at any time in the future my interlocutor’s use of the expression 
in question may simply stop conforming to the pattern I expect.  And that would 
retrospectively undermine my present claim to be able to vouch for the character of his 
understanding (1984, p. 348). 
But that, McDowell thinks, is a mistake.  It is true that mutual understanding rests on a ‘tissue of 
contingencies’ (1984, p. 349).  And it is true that those contingencies might break down; an 
interlocutor who currently uses a word in a way I seem to understand might go on to use it in a 
bizarre and unexpected way that I did not understand.  If that were to happen, however, the fact 
that I did not then understand her would not entail that I do not currently know what she means.  
Common sense distinguishes two different possibilities.   
(a) I know what she currently means by the word.  Then her use of the word changes.  I 
do not know what if anything she means by the word after the change. 
(b)  I do not know what she currently means by the word, though I initially appear to 
understand her.  Her use of the word is consistent over time.  What emerges from 
my failure to understand her later uses of the word is that I did not understand what 
she meant by it earlier. 
The thesis that semantic facts supervene on sub-bedrock facts, McDowell suggests, represents every 
case in which my interlocutor’s use of an expression stops ‘conforming to the pattern I expect’ as a 
case of type (b); it implies that a current claim to know what someone means will always be 
undermined if her subsequent use of the expression diverges from the pattern I expected.  But that 
overlooks the possibility of cases of type (a). 
 McDowell is right that we must allow for the existence of both kinds of case: (a) and (b).  But 
the defender of supervenience can do that perfectly well.  In criticizing supervenience, what 
McDowell has in mind is the thesis that what a person means by an expression at a given time 
supervenes on non-semantic facts about her actual applications of the expression at that and 
subsequent times.  But it is natural to offer this different formulation: what a person means by an 
expression at a given time supervenes on non-semantic facts about her use of the expression at that 
time, including facts about how she is then disposed to use it.  We can explore this latter formulation 
in connection with a different example of Wittgenstein’s. 
 Wittgenstein writes: 
Let us imagine the following example: A writes down series of numbers; B watches him and 
tries to find a rule for the number series.  If he succeeds, he exclaims: ‘Now I can go on!’ (PI 
§151) 
He considers a particular case: ‘A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; at this point B says 
he knows how to go on’ (PI §151).  The discussion continues: 
Suppose B says he knows how to go on – but when he wants to go on, he hesitates and can’t 
do it.  Are we then to say that it was wrong of him to say he could go on; or rather, that he 
was able to go on then, only now is not? – Clearly, we shall say different things in different 
cases.  (PI §181.  See PI §323 and BB 115-16 for further discussion.) 
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It seems clear that the truth or falsity of the claim ‘Now I can go on!’ does not supervene on facts 
about what actually happens when the speaker does in fact try to go on.  If it did, we would lose the 
common-sense distinction between someone (call her Able) who was able to go on when she said 
could but cannot now and the person (call her Unable) who was never able to go on but only 
thought she could.  But that does not mean we should abandon the idea that semantic facts 
supervene on non-semantic facts.  It just means that we need to specify the right non-semantic 
supervenience base.  And the obvious thought is that the non-semantic facts on which the truth or 
falsity of the claim ‘Now I can go on!’ supervene include dispositional facts.  At the time when she 
spoke, Able was disposed, ceteris paribus, to put ‘41, 55, 71, 89, 109, . . .’ after ‘1, 5, 11, 19, 29 . . .’.  
Unable was not.   
There are well-known difficulties in any attempt to spell out dispositional conditions for the 
truth or assertability of individual claims about meaning and rule-following, taken one by one.13  For 
one thing, what someone who can develop a particular series would do if she were to attempt to 
develop it depends not just on her knowledge of the series but also on her desire to develop it 
correctly, the strength of any competing desires, her belief about what stage of the series she has 
reached, and so on.  For another thing, even if she tries to develop the series correctly, she may 
make a mistake.  And so on.  So there is no question of pairing individual semantic facts about a 
person with facts about individual dispositions, characterized non-semantically.  If it is to be 
plausible, the supervenience thesis must be that the semantic facts about a person, as a whole, 
supervene on non-semantic facts about her, including dispositional facts, as a whole. 
It is tempting to think that differences in non-semantic dispositions must in turn supervene 
on something more basic: on differences in underlying physical states.  After all, if two people differ 
in some dispositional respect, there will be possible circumstances in which one person would do 
something that the other would not do.  We naturally think that there must be some causal 
explanation of any such difference in behaviour and that the explanation must ultimately come 
down to some difference in underlying brain states.14  So, it is tempting to argue, semantic facts 
ultimately supervene on occurrent physical facts.  But the defender of semantic supervenience need 
not accept this argument.  And if dispositional properties can be fundamental features of things, she 
should certainly not accept it. 
Wittgenstein, for one, explicitly accepts that a person’s dispositional properties need not 
supervene on her occurrent brain states; dispositional properties may be fundamental.   
It is . . . perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated 
physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them. 
I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I remember his 
name.  And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system?  
Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be stored up there in any form?  Why 
must a trace have been left behind?  Why should there not be a psychological regularity to 
which no physiological regularity corresponds?  If this upsets our concepts of causality then 
it is high time that they were upset. 
. . . 
Why should there not be a natural law connecting a starting and a finishing state of 
a system, but not covering the intermediary state?  (Only one must not think of causal 
efficacy.) (Z §§609-10, 613) 
Applied to our case, the possibility that Wittgenstein is envisaging is this.  Able and Unable both say 
‘Now I can go on’ but cannot continue the series when they try to do so.  What Able said was true; 
she really could go on when she said she could.  What Unable said was false; she thought she could 
go on but she couldn’t.  There is a dispositional difference between them: at the time when they 
spoke, Able was disposed ceteris paribus to continue the series correctly; Unable was not.  But there 
is no further physical difference underlying and explaining this dispositional difference.  It is just a 
brute fact that Able’s exposure to the initial steps in the series left her with the disposition to 
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develop the series in that way, while Unable’s exposure to the same thing left her with no such 
disposition. 
 The point I want to stress here is that the possibility we have just described is entirely 
consistent with the idea that semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties.  There is 
(in our extended sense) a semantic difference between Able and Unable: Able understands the 
series and knows how to continue it; Unable does not.  That semantic difference is underpinned by a 
non-semantic difference; there is a difference between what Able is disposed to do and say, 
characterized non-semantically, and what Unable is disposed to do and say, similarly characterized.  
The dispositional difference is fundamental; it does not supervene on any further, more basic, 
physical difference between Able and Unable.  But to make that point is not to reject the thesis that 
semantic facts supervene on non-semantic facts.  It is just to acknowledge that the non-semantic 
facts on which semantic facts supervene may be, or include, irreducibly dispositional facts. 
 With that in mind, we can return to the distinction McDowell draws between two cases in 
which someone’s future use of an expression confounds our expectations: case (a) where we now 
understand our interlocutor but no longer understand her in future; and case (b) where we never 
understand what she means by the expression, though we initially seemed to understand.  As I said 
above, I agree that an adequate account of meaning must make room for that distinction.  And I 
agree that the specific version of supervenience that McDowell has in mind does not make room for 
it.  But a different version can accommodate the distinction perfectly well, treating it as we treated 
the distinction between Able and Unable.  There is a semantic difference between the two cases; the 
speaker is using the expression with one meaning in case (a) and a different meaning in case (b).  
That semantic difference does not supervene on any difference in the non-semantic facts about her 
actual past or future applications of the expression; those are the same in both cases.  But there is a 
non-semantic difference between the two cases: a difference at the level of the two speakers’ non-
semantic dispositions.  In case (a) she is currently disposed, ceteris paribus, to use the expression in 
one way, non-semantically characterized.  In case (b) she is currently disposed to use it in a different 
way.  As before, we naturally expect the dispositional difference between the two cases to 
supervene on a difference at the level of underlying physical states.  As before, however, there is no 
reason why things must work like that; the difference in non-semantic dispositions could be a brute 
difference.  But even if the dispositional difference is a brute difference, that does not threaten the 
thesis of semantic supervenience.  For there will still be a non-semantic difference between the two 
cases, (a) and (b); it will simply be an ineliminably dispositional difference.  And, as we saw in the 
case of Able and Unable, that is consistent with the thesis that semantic facts supervene on non-
semantic facts.  We will return to the lessons of these cases in the next section.  
McDowell is certainly right to reject the inferential picture of knowledge of another person’s 
meaning that he associates with the claim that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic, ‘sub-
bedrock’, facts about use.  But that is consistent with accepting the supervenience thesis itself, 
which is a claim about the metaphysics of meaning and rule-following, not a claim about our 
knowledge of meaning and rule-following.  Of course, an acceptable account of the metaphysics of 
meaning has to be consistent with a plausible account of the epistemology of meaning.  But nothing 
in the thesis of semantic supervenience, as I have presented it, conflicts with that requirement. 
  
 
4. Intentional Ghosts and Semantic Magic 
In a recent paper, Kearns and Magidor offer a series of arguments against the thesis of semantic 
supervenience and in favour of ‘semantic sovereignty: the thesis that semantic facts do not 
supervene on use facts’ (Kearns and Magidor 2012, p. 322).  Their arguments fall into two general 
kinds.  First, they offer a range of counterexamples which, they argue, show that the thesis of 
semantic supervenience is false.  Second, they consider a family of familiar arguments, due to Quine, 
Putnam, and Kripke’s Wittgenstein, that ‘purport to show that use facts are insufficient to determine 
semantic facts’ (2012, p. 335)15.  They argue for the plausibility of a ‘neglected response’ to such 
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arguments: that semantic facts are a fundamental and irreducible feature of reality and thus that the 
fact (if it is a fact) that use facts underdetermine semantic facts is no threat to the reality of semantic 
facts.16  Though these more general considerations certainly deserve consideration, I shall focus here 
on Kearns and Magidor’s argument from counterexamples.17  
Kearns and Magidor start with a series of counterexamples that are targeted at the claim 
that semantic facts supervene on physical facts (which, they say, is the ‘commonly accepted picture’ 
(2012, p. 324)), rather than at the more general claim that semantic facts supervene on non-
semantic facts about use.  These initial counterexamples involve pairs of worlds, w1 and w2, such 
that w2 is a physical duplicate of w1 but also contains non-physical subjects (‘ghosts’), or non-physical 
properties, that are absent from w1.  Kearns and Magidor argue that these non-physical differences 
between w1 and w2 make room for words in w2 to have different semantic properties from their 
counterparts in w1.  For instance, a word that has one meaning in w1 may have a different meaning 
in w2 because of the way that ghosts use the word in w2, even though all the physical facts about its 
use by physical language-users are the same in both worlds (2012, pp. 327, 328-9).  Or a word that 
refers to a physical thing or property in w1 may refer to a non-physical thing or property in w2 (2012, 
pp. 329-30).  So physically duplicate worlds can differ in their semantic properties; semantic facts do 
not supervene on physical facts. 
Examples of this kind may challenge the thesis that semantic facts supervene on physical 
facts.  But, as Kearns and Magidor acknowledge, they do not by themselves threaten the thesis that 
semantic facts supervene on use facts (2012, pp. 339-40).  For in these cases the differences 
between the semantic facts in w1 and in w2 are explained by differences in the use of words between 
w1 and w2; it is just that, in the presence of non-physical language-users and non-physical properties, 
there can be differences in use between two worlds without those worlds differing in any physical 
respect.  For present purposes, then, we must concentrate on those of Kearns and Magidor’s 
counterexamples that specifically target the thesis that semantic facts supervene on use facts.   
 The first of these more specific counterexamples appeals to the possible existence of ‘purely 
semantic (and in particular, purely intentional) entities’: ‘purely intentional ghosts’, in their 
terminology.  Purely intentional ghosts, they say, ‘have various mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) 
but lack any (interesting) non-semantic properties.  Such ghosts seem readily conceivable.  Indeed, 
they seem to be what are normally called Cartesian minds’ (2012, p. 340).  Suppose that purely 
intentional ghosts are indeed possible.  And suppose that w2 is a non-semantic duplicate of w1 but 
contains in addition a number of purely intentional ghosts, which are absent from w1.  That creates 
an immediate challenge to the thesis of semantic supervenience.  For, though w2 does not differ 
from w1 in any non-semantic respect, it will differ semantically from w1: most obviously, by 
containing the thoughts and attitudes possessed by these purely intentional ghosts; but also, 
because the existence of the ghosts and their thoughts will affect the reference and truth-value of 
some of the thoughts and utterances of ordinary subjects.18  How should a defender of semantic 
supervenience respond to this kind of example? 
 In the first place, when Kearns and Magidor offer counterexamples that appeal to the 
possible existence of purely intentional ghosts, they are not really offering an argument for the 
falsity of semantic supervenience; they are in effect simply asserting that the supervenience claim is 
false.  For the supposition that there can be subjects that have intentional (and thus, semantic) 
properties without having any non-semantic properties just is the supposition that semantic 
properties do not supervene on non-semantic properties.  If there is an argument here, it is one that 
proceeds from the conceivability of purely intentional ghosts to their possibility.19  Such an argument 
invites one of the standard responses to arguments of this kind; either purely intentional ghosts are 
not really conceivable or else they are conceivable, but their conceivability does not entail their 
possible existence. 
 However, even if Kearns and Magidor have given us no positive reason to think that purely 
intentional ghosts are possible, they might say that the defender of supervenience, for her part, has 
given us no reason to think that purely intentional ghosts are not possible.  The onus, they might 
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argue, is on the defender of supervenience to give us some positive reason to think, first, that every 
possessor of semantic properties must have some non-semantic properties and, second, that its 
semantic properties must supervene on its non-semantic properties.  That is a legitimate challenge.  
What positive reason is there to think that the thesis of semantic supervenience is true? 
There is a rich history of philosophical argument against the intelligibility of Cartesian 
subjects, or purely intentional ghosts.  There are arguments, originating with Kant and Strawson, 
that contend that we can only make sense of the existence of individual subjects if they are 
substantial entities that possess non-intentional as well as intentional properties.20  And there are 
arguments, originating with Wittgenstein, that contend that we cannot make sense of the existence 
of mental phenomena in the purely first-person way that is all that remains if we try to think away 
the embodiment and behavioural expression of the mental.21  I think those arguments make a 
compelling case against the conceivability of Cartesian subjects.  But not every philosopher finds 
them convincing.  Can we appeal to arguments of a different kind to support the thesis of semantic 
supervenience? 
One obvious suggestion is that we could argue for semantic supervenience on causal 
grounds, in a way that mirrors a standard argument for the supervenience of mental properties on 
physical properties.  In outline, the argument would go like this.  (i) Semantic phenomena play a 
causal role in producing and explaining other phenomena.  For instance, my turning right is causally 
explained by your saying ‘Turn right’.  And the fact that ‘Turn right’ means what it does plays a role 
in that explanation; if ‘Turn right’ had meant turn left, your saying what you did would not have 
caused the effect it did.  (ii) Every phenomenon has a complete non-semantic cause.  (iii) The effects 
of semantic causes are not overdetermined by their semantic and non-semantic causes.  So (iv) 
Semantic phenomena must supervene on non-semantic phenomena.  Despite the popularity of that 
form of argument, however, it seems dialectically ineffective to appeal to that line of thought in the 
current debate with Kearns and Magidor. 
In the first place, if Kearns and Magidor are right that there could be purely intentional 
ghosts, that will immediately undercut the causal argument for supervenience.  For, in a world 
containing purely intentional ghosts, it would not be true that every phenomenon had a complete 
non-semantic cause; in particular, the actions of purely intentional ghosts would not have complete 
non-semantic causes.  In the second place, even without appealing to the alleged possibility of 
purely intentional ghosts, the opponent of supervenience may simply deny that every phenomenon 
must have a complete non-semantic cause.  It is perfectly possible, she may argue, for two things to 
have different effects, in virtue of having different semantic properties, without differing in any non-
semantic respect.  So, she will say, we should reject premise (ii) of the causal argument; it is not true 
that every phenomenon must have a complete non-semantic cause.  And that undermines the 
causal argument for supervenience.  It is no coincidence that Kearns and Magidor’s second series of 
counterexamples to semantic supervenience take precisely this form (2012, pp. 341-2). 
Consider two worlds, w1 and w2, that are exactly alike in every non-semantic respect.  They 
are also alike in every semantic respect, with one exception.  In both worlds, the word ‘cat’ refers to 
cats.  In both worlds, the word ‘cat’ has never in fact been uttered by anyone to refer to cats.22  But 
w1 and w2 differ in the following respect.  In w1, if someone were to utter the word ‘cat’, thereby 
referring to cats, their doing so would have no special effect.  But in w2, if someone uttered ‘cat’ to 
refer to cats, their doing so would have the effect of magically turning their interlocutor into a 
unicorn.  Since w1 and w2 are alike in all non-semantic respects, there would be no natural, non-
semantic causal explanation of that effect; that is the point of describing the effect as magical.  And, 
Kearns and Magidor stress, the magical effect really would be causally explained by the semantic 
properties of the action of uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats; merely making the sound ‘cat’, 
rather than uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats, would have no such effect.  (I will return to this 
point shortly.)  Kearns and Magidor then argue as follows.  The difference between w1 and w2 is a 
semantic difference.  But w1 and w2 are non-semantic duplicates.  So worlds can differ semantically 
without differing non-semantically; semantic facts do not supervene on non-semantic facts.23 
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Is this argument convincing?  I agree with Kearns and Magidor that there is a semantic 
difference between w1 and w2 in their example.  The semantic action of uttering the word ‘cat’ to 
refer to cats would have different causal consequences in w1 and w2; and that is itself a semantic 
difference between the two worlds.  But, I shall argue, when we reflect on the causal differences 
between w1 and w2, it is clear that, pace Kearns and Magidor, there is also a non-semantic difference 
between the two worlds.  So the case is not an effective counterexample to the thesis of semantic 
supervenience. 
The basic structure of Kearns and Magidor’s case is this.  The semantic difference between 
w1 and w2 is a difference in dispositional properties: a difference in what would happen if someone 
were to utter ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  And the difference in dispositional properties, or causal powers, 
is fundamental: it does not supervene on any underlying difference in occurrent non-semantic 
properties; w1 and w2 are alike with respect to all such non-semantic properties.  Now that, of 
course, is exactly the structure that we saw in the previous section in the case of Able and Unable.  
There is a semantic difference between Able and Unable.  The semantic difference involves a 
difference in dispositional properties: at the point when they both said ‘Now I can go on’, Able 
understood the series and would ceteris paribus have continued it correctly had she tried to do so; 
Unable did not understand the series and would not have continued it correctly.  And, we supposed, 
the dispositional difference does not supervene on any underlying difference in occurrent non-
semantic properties; Able and Unable are alike with respect to all such properties.  Nonetheless, we 
said, the case does not threaten the supervenience thesis.  For there is a non-semantic difference 
between Able and Unable; they have different non-semantic dispositional properties.  In particular, 
Able is disposed, ceteris paribus, to put ‘41, 55, 71, 89, 109, . . .’  after ‘1, 5, 11, 19, 29 . . .’; Unable is 
not.24 
We can treat the case of words whose utterance would have magic effects in w2 but not w1 
in essentially the same way.  In particular, even though w1 and w2 are alike with respect to all 
occurrent non-semantic properties, they differ with respect to their non-semantic dispositional 
properties.   
In order for me to utter the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats, two conditions must be satisfied.  (i) I 
must make the sound ‘cat’; and (ii) I must do so in a context in which making the sound ‘cat’ counts 
as uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  With that in mind, consider the two worlds, w1 and w2, in 
the ‘cat’ example.  In both worlds, the context is such that, if I were to make the sound ‘cat’, I would 
count as uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  Given the context, therefore, my making the sound 
‘cat’ would have different effects in w1 and in w2.  But then there is, after all, a non-semantic 
difference between w1 and w2: holding context fixed, my making the sound ‘cat’ in w2 would turn 
someone into a unicorn; doing the same thing in w1 would have no such effect.  That is a difference 
at the level of dispositional properties, non-semantically characterized.  There is, ex hypothesi, no 
further non-semantic difference between w1 and w2 that explains why making the sound ‘cat’, in this 
context, would have such different effects in the two worlds.  It is just a brute fact that it would.  It 
remains the case, however, that there is a non-semantic difference between the two worlds: w1 and 
w2 are not non-semantic duplicates.  So the case of words with magical properties is not an effective 
counterexample to the thesis of semantic supervenience. 
It might be objected that this argument overlooks Kearns and Magidor’s specification that 
what causes my interlocutor to turn into a unicorn in w2 is not my making the sound ‘cat’ but my 
uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  I have argued that there is a non-semantic difference 
between w1 and w2 at the level of dispositional properties, on the grounds that making the sound 
‘cat’ in w2 would cause someone to turn into a unicorn but doing the same thing in w1 would have 
no such effect.  But, the objector will protest, that is not true.   Making the sound ‘cat’ would have 
no special effect in either world; what does the causal work in w2 is uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer 
to cats.  So, contrary to what I have claimed, w1 and w2 really are alike with respect to all non-
semantic properties, both occurrent and dispositional. 
W Child – ‘Meaning, Use, and Supervenience’ - in J. Conant and S. Sunday (eds.) Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, 




But the idea that what turns my interlocutor into a unicorn in w2 is not my making the sound 
‘cat’ but my uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats needs to be handled with care.  The context we 
are considering is one in which, in both w1 and w2, my making the sound ‘cat’ counts as uttering the 
word ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  In that context, my action of making the sound ‘cat’ just is an action of 
uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats.  So it cannot be true that what causes the magical effect in w2 
is my uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats rather than my making the sound ‘cat’.  The point the 
objector is reaching for can be put in terms of counterfactuals: if I were in a different context, in 
which my making the sound ‘cat’ did not count as my uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to cats, then 
making the sound ‘cat’ would have no magical effect.  That is true.  But it is irrelevant to the current 
argument.  The crucial question is whether there is a relevant non-semantic difference between w1 
and w2 in the case in which making the sound ‘cat’ would count as uttering the word ‘cat’ to refer to 
cats, and would therefore produce different effects in w1 and w2.  And, as I have argued, there 
clearly is such a difference: given the context, there is a difference in what would happen in w1 and 
w2 if I were to make the sound ‘cat’.  So the semantic difference between w1 and w2 is underpinned 




We have rejected two arguments against the thesis that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic 
facts about use.  McDowell, I argued, was right to reject the particular version of the supervenience 
thesis that he had in mind.  But a better version, which includes non-semantic dispositions in the 
supervenience base, is not vulnerable to McDowell’s criticism.  Kearns and Magidor offered two 
kinds of counterexample to semantic supervenience.  The first depended on the possible existence 
of purely intentional subjects.  But to suppose that purely intentional ghosts are possible, I said, is in 
effect simply to suppose that semantic supervenience is false; it does not constitute an argument 
against the supervenience thesis.  And, I suggested, there are good reasons for thinking that purely 
intentional ghosts are not possible, though I have not defended the arguments here.  Kearns and 
Magidor’s second kind of counterexample involved the possibility of semantic phenomena having 
magical effects: effects that cannot be causally explained in non-semantic terms.  I agreed that that 
kind of case is possible.  But, I argued, that possibility is consistent with semantic supervenience, 
once we acknowledge, as we should, that the non-semantic facts on which semantic facts supervene 
can include brutely dispositional facts.25 
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1 Wittgenstein restricts this ‘explanation’ to ‘a large class of cases of the employment of the word 
“meaning”’.  For present purposes we can focus on that class of cases, leaving aside cases to which 
Wittgenstein’s explanation is not intended to apply. 
2 For other statements of Stroud’s anti-reductionism about meaning, see Stroud 2000, pp. ix, 91-2, 
130.  For similarly anti-reductionist readings of Wittgenstein’s view of meaning and use, see McGinn 
1984, McDowell 1984, Child 2011, pp. 95-104.  Boghossian 1989 advocates an anti-reductionist view 
of meaning as the best response to Kripke’s Wittgenstein; he does not take a stand on 
Wittgenstein’s own position. 
3 Wittgenstein writes, in a related context: ‘Here there is nothing more difficult than to avoid 
pleonasms and only to say what really describes something’ (RFM VI §21).  He thinks it is difficult to 
say something substantial and non-pleonastic; he does not think it is impossible. 
4 Here I disagree with Hannah Ginsborg, who argues in recent work that there is a primitive way of 
taking a performance to be appropriate in its context, which is independent of any prior grasp of 
meaning or rules (see Ginsborg 2011).  She appeals to this ‘consciousness of . . . primitive 
appropriateness’ (2011, p. 248) to offer a ‘partly reductionist’ explanation of facts about meaning 
and rule-following in terms of ‘facts that are in a sense more primitive’, though not purely 
naturalistic (2011, p. 230).  I plan to discuss this interesting proposal elsewhere.  
5 Compare RFM VII §26: ‘what the correct following of a rule consists in cannot be described more 
closely than by describing the learning of “proceeding according to the rule.”’     
6 In other passages, Wittgenstein stresses a distinction between genuine predictions (e.g. ‘if you 
follow the rules of multiplication as best you can, you will get 625’) and propositions that look like 
predictions but are really pleonasms – ways of stating what the rule in question requires (e.g. ‘if you 
follow the rules of multiplication, you will get 625’).  ‘It is not a prediction’, he writes, ‘if the concept 
of following the rule is so determined, that the result is the criterion for whether the rule was 
followed’ (RFM VI §15).  Someone might object that the ‘predictions’ Wittgenstein describes in RFM 
III §66 are not supposed to be genuine predictions at all: that they fall on the ‘pleonasm’ side of his 
distinction.  In the context of the quoted passage, however, it is clear that Wittgenstein does mean 
to be describing genuine predictions: ‘In a technique of calculating, prophecies must be possible’ 
(RFM III §67). 
7 See Kearns and Magidor 2012, pp. 323-4. 
8 See Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975. 
9 For this picture, see Lewis 1983 and 1984. 
10 For an objection of this form, see Glock and Preston 1995. 
11 See Child 2010, pp. 65-9. 
12 See Child 2017. 
13 See Kripke 1982, pp. 22-37. 
14 We can for these purposes safely leave aside differences in behaviour that depend entirely on 
differences in the external environment, such as the difference between the behaviour I exhibit in 
drinking a glass of water and the behaviour my Twin Earth doppelganger exhibits in drinking a glass 
of XYZ. 
15 See Quine 1960, Putnam 1978, Kripke 1982. 
16 Kearns and Magidor cite Boghossian’s proposal that ‘the so-called “Kripkenstein puzzle” ought to 
be solved by accepting a non-reductive view of semantic facts’ as a ‘rare exception’ to the general 
neglect of anti-reductionism as a plausible option in this debate (2012, p. 336, n. 30).  As noted 
above, anti-reductionist responses to Kripke’s Wittgenstein are also offered by McDowell, McGinn, 
and Stroud, amongst others. 
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17 For reasons of space, I also set aside one class of Kearns and Magidor’s counterexamples: those 
involving worlds that are non-semantic duplicates but which allegedly differ in haecceitistic semantic 
properties (2012, pp. 331-5, 342-4).  I hope to consider that class of counterexamples elsewhere. 
18 In this phase of their discussion, Kearns and Magidor also offer a different counterexample, which 
appeals to the possibility of ordinary human thinkers having purely intentional properties: 
intentional properties whose possession by a person is completely independent of her possession of 
any non-intentional properties (2012, p. 340).  The issues raised by that case are not fundamentally 
different from those raised by the alleged possibility of purely intentional ghosts. 
19 There are some indications that that is indeed how Kearns and Magidor are thinking of things.  
When they introduce the idea of purely intentional ghosts they point out that such beings ‘seem 
readily conceivable’ (2012, p. 340).  And they stress in a different but related case that ‘there is 
nothing clearly incoherent about the scenario we have presented’ and argue that ‘our case presents 
a challenge to the proponent of [supervenience] precisely because the scenario we describe seems 
perfectly possible’ (2012, p. 342). 
20 For Kant’s arguments, see ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ in Kant [1781]1998, pp. 411-58.  For 
Strawson’s arguments, see Strawson 1966, pp. 162-9. 
21 See PI §§243-315, 350-1.  For related considerations, see Strawson 1959, chapter 3, and Williams 
1978, pp. 100-1. 
22 How can the word ‘cat’ refer to cats without ever having been uttered by anyone?  Well: it may 
have been written down, described, gestured at, and so on.  (Compare the case of a society with a 
deity whose name, for religious reasons, is never uttered by anyone.  It seems unproblematic that 
the name really is a name of the deity.) 
23 I have slightly adapted the case, for ease of presentation.  But its essentials are taken from Kearns 
and Magidor. 
24 Someone might object that to characterize something as a case of ‘putting “41, 55 . . .” after “. . . 
19, 29”’ is already to characterize it in semantic terms (in our extended sense), on the grounds that it 
involves characterizing it as an intentional action.  Even if that is true, it remains the case that there 
will be some way of characterizing non-semantically what would have happened had Able tried to 
develop the series.  That is all that the defender of supervenience requires. 
25 Earlier versions of some of this material were presented at the University of Helsinki and at the 
Higher School of Economics in Moscow.  I am grateful to the audiences on both occasions for very 
helpful discussion. 
